Economics Publications and Research

For Rich or for Poor: When does Uncovered Interest Parity Hold?

Maurice J. Roche et al. — Thu, 04 Nov 2010 11:41:09 PDT

We present a model that simultaneously explains why uncovered interest parity holds for some pairs of countries and not for others. The flexible-price two-country monetary model is extended to include a consumption externality with habit persistence. Habit persistence is modeled using Campbell Cochrane preferences with ‘deep’ habits along the lines of the work of Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe. By deep habits, we mean habits defined over goods rather than countries. The negative slope in the Fama regression arises when monetary instability is low and the precautionary savings motive dominates the intertemporal substitution motive. When monetary instability is high, the Fama slope is positive in line with uncovered interest parity. The model is simulated using the artificial economy methodology for 34 currencies against the US dollar. We conclude that, given the predominance of precautionary savings, the degree of monetary instability explains whether or not uncovered interest parity holds.

A theory of sharecropping: the role of price behavior and imperfect competition

Debapriya Sen — Thu, 04 Nov 2010 11:31:10 PDT

This paper proposes a theory of sharecropping on the basis of price behavior in agriculture and imperfectly competitive nature of rural product markets. We consider a contractual setting between one landlord and one tenant with seasonal variation of price, where the tenant receives a low price for his output while the landlord can sell his output at a higher price by incurring a cost of storage. We consider two different classes of contracts: (i) tenancy contracts and (ii) crop-buying contracts. It is shown that sharecropping is the optimal form within tenancy contracts and it also dominates crop-buying contracts provided the price variation is not too large. Then we consider interlinked contracts that have both tenancy and crop-buying elements and show that there are multiple optimal interlinked contracts. Finally, proposing an equilibrium refinement that incorporates imperfect competition in the rural product market, it is shown that the unique contract that is robust to this refinement results in sharecropping.

Evolution of the Week

Amy Peng et al. — Thu, 04 Nov 2010 11:31:09 PDT

he purpose of this paper is to provide an intuitive explanation of the emergence and evolution of the week based on a historical precedent draw from ancient Egypt. In this paper, we view the week as a coordinating social institution that was created to resolve a fundamental problem of society - coordinating market exchange. Artificial adaptive agents are used to simulate the interactions among farmers going to market. The results show that the length of the week that emerges depends on the chosen cost and benefit specifications and random interactions.

Outsourcing versus technology transfer: Hotelling meets Stackelberg

Andrea Pierce et al. — Thu, 04 Nov 2010 11:31:09 PDT

This paper considers a Hotelling duopoly with two firms A and B in the final good market. Both A and $B$ can produce the required intermediate good, firm B having a lower cost due to a superior technology. We compare two contracts: outsourcing (A orders the intermediate good from B) and technology transfer (B transfers its technology to A). First we show that an outsourcing order acts as a credible commitment on part of A to maintain a certain market share in the final good market. This generates an indirect Stackelberg leadership effect, which is absent in a technology transfer contract. We show that compared to the situation of no contracts, there are always Pareto improving outsourcing contracts but no Pareto improving technology transfer contracts. Finally, it is shown that whenever both firms prefer one of the two contracts, all consumers prefer the other contract.

The Evolution of the Conditional Joint Distribution of Life Expectancy and Per Capita Income Growth

Thanasis Stengos et al. — Thu, 04 Nov 2010 11:31:08 PDT

In this paper we investigate the joint conditional distribution of health (life expectancy) and income growth and its evolution over time. The conditional distributions of these two variables are obtained by applying nonparametric methods to a bivariate nonparametric regression system of equations. Analyzing the distributions of the nonparametric fitted values from these models we find strong evidence of movement over time and strong evidence of first-order stochastic dominance of the earlier years over the later ones. We also find strong evidence of second-order stochastic dominance by non-OECD countries over OECD countries in each period. Our results complement the findings of Wu, Savvides and Stengos (2008) who explored the unconditional behaviour of these joint distributions over time

Segmentation across International Equity, Bond, and Foreign Exchange Markets

Thu, 04 Nov 2010 11:31:07 PDT

In this paper, we examine the integration of international financial markets. The integration of financial markets across countries and across asset classes is assumed to hold in most empirical studies, but has only been tested for certain countries and certain asset classes. We test for the integration of international equity, bond and foreign exchange markets. Our results indicate that the three classes of assets are segmented. Investigating potential explanations for this segmentation, we find that there are differing degrees of segmentation across these markets and that this is related to the asset returns from each class being explained by different sets of economic risk factors. In pair-wise tests we find that the bond-equity and bond-foreign exchange markets appear to be more segmented than the equity-foreign exchange market.

Modeling Asymmetric Volatility Clusters Using Copulas and High Frequency Data

Cathy Ning et al. — Thu, 04 Nov 2010 11:31:06 PDT

Volatility clustering is a well-known stylized feature of financial asset returns. In this paper, we investigate the asymmetric pattern of volatility clustering on both the stock and foreign exchange rate markets. To this end, we employ copula-based semi-parametric univariate time-series models that accommodate the clusters of both large and small volatilities in the analysis. Using daily realized volatilities of the individual company stocks, stock indices and foreign exchange rates constructed from high frequency data, we find that volatility clustering is strongly asymmetric in the sense that clusters of large volatilities tend to be much stronger than those of small volatilities. In addition, the asymmetric pattern of volatility clusters continues to be visible even when the clusters are allowed to be changing over time, and the volatility clusters themselves remain persistent even after forty days.

Extreme Dependence in International Stock Markets

Cathy Ning — Thu, 04 Nov 2010 11:31:05 PDT

This paper investigates the structure and degree of extreme dependence in international equity markets using carefully selected tools from the theory of copulas. We examine both the static and dynamic dependence via unconditional and conditional copulas. We find significant asymmetric tail dependence in equity markets, with the overall larger lower tail dependence than upper tail dependence. Moreover, in Europe and East Asia but not in North America, the extreme dependence is time-varying in both its structure and degree. Our results also indicate a higher intra-continental than inter-continental tail dependence. Our findings have important implications in global risk management strategies.

Free Trade, Autarky And The Sustainability Of An International Environmental Agreement

Hassan Benchekroun et al. — Thu, 04 Nov 2010 11:31:04 PDT

We determine the impact of free trade on the sustainability of an international environmental agreement (IEA) and incorporate it into the assessment of the net benefits of opening up to free trade. We show that such an analysis can reverse the conclusions reached within a standard one-shot game framework. First, we examine a one shot game and argue that the benefits from an increase in economic activity due to free trade outweigh the extra cost of free trade associated with larger environmental damage. Then, we analyze the infinite repetition of the one-shot game where countries can use trigger strategies and show that there exist circumstances where an IEA is sustainable under autarky but not under free trade. This aggravates the environmental damages caused by free trade and leads to the possibility that autarky may welfare dominate free trade. This conclusion remains valid even when countries adopt the most cooperative environmental policy when the "fully cooperative" environmental policy is not sustainable.

The Dependence Structure of Macroeconomic Variables in the US

Cathy Q. Ning et al. — Thu, 04 Nov 2010 11:31:03 PDT

A central role for economic policy involves reducing the incidence of systemic downturns, when key economic variables experience joint extreme events. In this paper, we empirically analyze such dependence using two approaches, correlations and copulas. We document four findings. First, linear correlations and copulas disagree substantially about the nation’s dependence structure, indicating correlation complexity in the US economy. Second, GDP exhibits linear dependence with interest rates and prices, but no extreme dependence with the latter. This is consistent with the existence of liquidity traps. Third, GDP exhibits asymmetric extreme dependence with employment, consumption and investment, with relatively greater dependence during downturns. Fourth, money is neutral, especially during extreme economic conditions.

Introducing CGE Models to the Classroom Using EXCEL

Amy Peng — Thu, 04 Nov 2010 08:58:45 PDT

This paper demonstrates how simple general equilibrium models can be solved with the help of Microsoft Excel. Two different general equilibrium models for tax incidence analysis are used as illustrative examples. The methods presented here are intended to be beneficial to both students and teachers working with general equilibrium theory in the classroom and can easily be extended to various policy analysis term projects. The techniques presented here are simple and effective tools for inclusion in any student’s toolkit.

The Decision of Work and Study and Employment Outcomes

Amy Peng et al. — Thu, 04 Nov 2010 08:58:45 PDT

The paper studies factors that contribute to student's work study decision while attending postsecondary institutions using SLID and YITS data. It further tests that how the work decision can affect their future employment outcomes.

Strategic Outsourcing under Economies of Scale

Yutian Chen et al. — Thu, 04 Nov 2010 08:58:44 PDT

Economies of scale in upstream production can lead both disintegrated downstream firms as well as its vertically integrated rival to outsource offshore for intermediate goods, even if offshore production has moderate cost disadvantage compared to in-house production of the vertically integrated firm.

When an inefficient firm makes higher profit than its efficient rival

Debapriya Sen et al. — Thu, 04 Nov 2010 08:58:43 PDT

This paper considers a Cournot duopoly game with endogenous organization structures. There are two firms A and B who compete in the retail market, where A is more efficient than B. Prior to competition in the retail stage, firms simultaneously choose their organization structures which can be either 'centralized' (one central unit chooses quantity to maximize firm's profit) or 'decentralized' (the retail unit chooses quantity to maximize firm's revenue while the production unit supplies the required quantity). Identifying the (unique) Nash Equilibrium for every retail-stage subgame, we show that the reduced form game of organization choices is a potential game. The main result is that with endogenous organization structures, situations could arise where the less efficient firm B obtains a higher profit than its more efficient rival A.

Relative and Absolute Preference for Quality

Constantine Angyridis et al. — Thu, 04 Nov 2010 08:58:43 PDT

This paper seeks to explain two related phenomena: (i) it is often the case that when the new variety of a product is launched, some consumers do not purchase the latest variety and (ii) the quality of the latest variety of a product is often not significantly superior compared to the existing variety. We consider a simple model of monopoly with two types of consumers: "regular" (type R) who cares only about the absolute quality of the product and "fastidious" (type F) who cares about the relative quality vis-a-vis the existing variety. We show that it is never optimal for the monopolist to exclusively serve type F. Moreover, we identify situations where although it is optimal for the monopolist to upgrade the quality of the product, this upgrade is not sufficient to meet the standards of type F. As a result, only type R buys the upgraded variety while type F chooses not to buy it.

Foreign Direct Investment and Customs Union: Incentives for Multilateral Tariff Cooperation over Free Trade

Halis Murat Yildiz — Thu, 04 Nov 2010 08:58:42 PDT

We examine the implications of a customs union (CU) on the pattern of tariffs, welfare and the prospects for free trade when the nonmember firm has an incentive to engage in foreign direct investment (FDI). First we show that upon the formation of a bilateral CU, the non-member firm has greater incentives to engage in FDI. However, when FDI becomes a feasible entry option for the nonmember firm under a CU, member countries have incentives to strategically induce export over FDI by lowering their joint external tariff. When fixed set-up cost of FDI is sufficiently low, this tariff falls below Kemp-Wan tariff and CU leads to a Pareto improvement relative to no agreement. Moreover, using an infinite repetition of the one-shot tariff game under a CU, we show that FDI incentive of the nonmember firm makes the member countries (nonmember country) more (less) willing to cooperate multilaterally over free trade.

Modeling Asymmetric Volatility Clusters Using Copulas and High Frequency Data

Cathy Ning et al. — Thu, 04 Nov 2010 08:58:41 PDT

Empirical Issues in Lifetime Poverty Measurement

Michael Hoy et al. — Thu, 04 Nov 2010 08:58:40 PDT

This paper demonstrates the implications of adopting an approach to measuring poverty that takes into account the lifetime experience of individuals rather than simply taking a static or cross-sectional perspective. Our approach follows the theoretical innovations in Hoy and Zheng (2008) which address various aspects of the specific pattern of any poverty spells experienced by an individual as well as a possible retrospective consideration that an individual might have concerning his life experience as a whole. For an individual, our perspective of lifetime poverty is influenced by both the snapshot poverty of each period and the poverty level of the permanent lifetime consumption; it is also influenced by how poverty spells are distributed over the lifetime. Using PSID data for the US, we demonstrate empirically the power of alternative axioms concerning how lifetime poverty should be measured when making pairwise comparisons of individual lifetime profiles of consumption (income) experiences. We also demonstrate the importance of taking a lifetime view of poverty in comparing poverty between groups by use of the classic FGT ‘snapshot’ poverty index in conjunction with period weighting functions that explicitly reflect concerns about the pattern of poverty spells over individuals’ lifetimes.

Trade, growth, and convergence in a dynamic Heckscher-Ohlin model

Claustre Bajona et al. — Thu, 04 Nov 2010 08:24:33 PDT

In models in which convergence in income levels across closed countries is driven by faster accumulation of a productive factor in the poorer countries, opening these countries to trade can stop convergence and even cause divergence. We make this point using a dynamic Heckscher-Ohlin model — a combination of a static two-good, two-factor Heckscher-Ohlin trade model and a two-sector growth model — with infinitely lived consumers where international borrowing and lending are not permitted. We obtain two main results: First, countries that differ only in their initial endowments of capital per worker may converge or diverge in income levels over time, depending on the elasticity of substitution between traded goods. Divergence can occur for parameter values that would imply convergence in a world of closed economies and vice versa. Second, factor price equalization in a given period does not imply factor price equalization in future periods.

Bilateral trade agreements and the feasibility of multilateral free trade

Kamal Saggi et al. — Thu, 04 Nov 2010 08:24:32 PDT

This paper compares stable Nash equilibria of two games of trade liberalization. In the FTA game, each country can form an FTA with either one of its trade partners, or both of them, or none of them. By contrast, in the No FTA game, each country must choose either no agreement or free trade. Under symmetry, free trade is uniquely stable under the No FTA game whereas the FTA game also admits a bilateral FTA as an equilibrium. However, there exist patterns of cost asymmetry for which the freedom to pursue bilateral FTAs is necessary for achieving global free trade.