Document Type
Article
Publication Date
2007
Abstract
I defend the first premise of William Rowe’s well-known arguments from evil against influential criticisms due to William Alston. I next suggest that the central inference in Rowe’s arguments is best understood to move from the claim that we have an absence of evidence of a satisfactory theodicy to the claim that we have evidence of absence of such a theodicy. I endorse the view which holds that this move succeeds only if it is reasonable to believe that (roughly) if there were such a theodicy, we would probably know it. After conceding that there may be modest prima facie support for this latter claim via the Principle of Credulity, I consider and reject four more ambitious arguments in its favour. I conclude that this necessary condition on Rowe’s crucial inference has not been shown to be satisfied.
Recommended Citation
Kraay, Klaas J., "Absence of Evidence and Evidence of Absence" (2007). Philosophy Publications and Research. Paper 6.
http://digitalcommons.ryerson.ca/philosophy/6
Comments
This paper appears in Faith and Philosophy 24 (2007): 203-228. The published version can be
found online at: http://www.pdcnet.org/collection/faithphil_2007_0024_0002_0203_0228.pdf .